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MALAYSIA’S WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
CHALLENGE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE:  
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Michael W. Meredith† 
Abstract:  Recent negotiations between Malaysia and the European Union (“EU”), 
aimed at establishing a free trade agreement, have come to a standstill, due in part to a 
policy implemented by the EU known as the Renewable Energy Directive.  The 
Renewable Energy Directive grants a tax credit to renewable fuel sources that emit at 
least 35% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels.  Malaysian officials have 
criticized the 35% level included in the EU policy because it grants a tax credit to 
rapeseed oil biofuel, produced mainly in Europe (which emits 38% less greenhouse gas 
than traditional fossil fuels), but does not extend the credit to imported Malaysian palm 
oil biofuel (which emits about 19% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels).  
Malaysia asserts that the 35% standard is arbitrary and uses environmental policy to 
achieve unrelated protectionist ends at the expense of Malaysian producers.  Malaysian 
officials have even gone so far as to threaten a lawsuit against the EU at the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), arguing that the policy’s differential treatment of rapeseed oil 
biofuel and palm oil biofuel violates the WTO’s policy of non-discrimination.  The WTO 
policy of non-discrimination stands for the proposition that like products should not be 
taxed or sanctioned differently simply due to their nation of origin.  Traditionally, to 
determine if two products are alike within the meaning of the non-discrimination 
principle, the WTO compares the physical characteristics of the products in question as 
well as their end use in the consumer market.  Because both EU- and Malaysian-
produced biofuels are used for the same purpose and look almost identical, many 
commentators have suggested that the two products should be considered alike and that a 
Malaysian suit challenging their differential taxation under the EU Renewable Energy 
Directive would be successful.  Malaysia’s proposed suit, however, raises a number of 
questions for the international trading arena that cannot effectively be addressed by 
traditional methods of determining likeness.  Therefore, this comment suggests that the 
WTO should use this opportunity to adopt an economic, market-based approach to its 
likeness determinations, which would not only more completely and correctly address the 
relationship between Malaysian and EU-made products, but also indicate that Malaysia’s 
proposed suit should fail. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The stated goal of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is to 
protect comparative advantage and economic efficiency in the international 
trade market.1  One of the WTO’s primary means to achieve these ends is the 
                                                      
†
 Juris Doctor expected in 2012, University of Washington School of Law.  The author would like 
to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff. 
1
 Although the ultimate goals of the WTO are, among other things, to increase global standards of 
living, development, and reduced unemployment, the means to achieve those ends is the protection of 
comparative advantage.  AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A VERY SHORT 
INTRODUCTION 2 (2005). 
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principle of “non-discrimination”—the concept that member countries 
should not discriminate against similar or “like” products, through taxation 
or tariff, simply because of their nation of origin.2  Traditionally, the WTO 
analyzes whether two products are similar or alike by comparing the 
products’ physical characteristics. 3   This method, however, excludes a 
careful consideration of the economic and competitive relationship between 
products in a given market.4  As a result, optimally efficient WTO trade 
policies remain the exception rather than the rule.5 
Recent challenges to a number of allegedly discriminatory policies 
highlight these limitations to the WTO’s traditional methods of determining 
likeness.  For example, Malaysia has criticized a European Union (“EU”) 
policy that grants a tax credit to certain environmentally-friendly renewable 
fuel sources as a violation of the WTO’s non-discrimination principles.6  
Malaysia’s criticism stems from the perceived “likeness” of Europe’s 
domestically produced rapeseed oil biofuel to Malaysian palm oil.  The EU’s 
policy grants domestically produced rapeseed oil a tax credit, but does not 
extend that credit to imported Malaysian palm oil due to the level of 
greenhouse gas it emits when burned.7  
 Palm oil and rapeseed oil are substantially different in terms of 
energy density, production costs, and environmental impact. 8   However, 
because the two oils share similar physical characteristics, many 
commentators suggest that Malaysia would be successful in a discrimination 
claim at the WTO based upon traditional definitions of likeness.9  While 
Malaysia has not yet filed suit at the WTO, Tan Sri Datuk Dr. Yusof Basiron, 
the Malaysian Palm Oil Council’s Chief Executive Officer, has expressed his 
intention to do so in a number of public statements.10 
                                                      
2
 Id. at 15-16. 
3
 As will be discussed later in this comment, “physical characteristics” is one of two traditional 
methods used by WTO panels.  A second method is a comparison of the “end use” of a product for the 
consumer.  However, even this method often includes a consideration of the physical characteristics.  
Robert E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY 
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101, 104 (Thomas Cottier 
et al. eds., 2000). 
4
 Id. at 106.  
5
 Id. at 104. 
6
 Hanim Adnan, Malaysia Cries Foul Over EU Renewable Energy Directive on Palm Oil, THE 




8 Ayhan Demirbas, Fuel Conversional Aspects of Palm Oil and Sunflower Oil, 25 ENERGY 
SOURCES 457-65 (2003).  See also infra Appendix B. 
9
 Hanim Adnan, Malaysia Has Strong Case Against EU RED, THE STAR, Aug. 5, 2010, 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/8/5/business/6799755&sec=business. 
10
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This comment suggests that, in order to both effectively address the 
issues raised by Basiron’s proposed suit and to better achieve the WTO’s 
stated goals, the organization should resist the impulse to apply 
mechanically the traditional physical characteristics model of “likeness” 
when considering Malaysia’s claims.  Instead, the WTO should analyze 
Malaysia’s suit under an “economic likeness” standard, taking into account 
basic market indicators such as consumer demand, production cost, 
international market interactions, and the level of competition between 
products that traditional methods of determining likeness marginalize or 
exclude entirely.11 
Part II of this comment explores the political and economic 
relationship between Malaysia and the EU that has given rise to Malaysian 
threats of a WTO suit.  Part III addresses why traditional methods of 
determining likeness fail in the context of Malaysia’s potential suit.  Finally, 
Part IV explains the benefits of the “economic likeness” analysis in the 
Malaysian case and proposes why the WTO should adopt the test in 
analogous cases.   
II. BACKGROUND: A RECENT HISTORY OF THE TRADING RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND THE EU 
Neither Malaysia’s current antagonistic position towards European 
trade efforts nor its interest in pursuing a WTO suit developed overnight.  In 
fact, Malaysia’s saber-rattling at the WTO reflects decades of stalled efforts 
at strengthening economic ties between Asia and the EU.12  Thus, in order to 
assess more fully the relevance and validity of Malaysia’s proposed suit, it is 
useful to consider briefly the major historical and economic events that have 
structured and informed the current relationship between these trading 
partners.  
For years, European exporters have attempted to gain fuller access to 
Southeast Asian markets through trade agreements negotiated by the EU.13  
The EU’s efforts to increase trade and commercial engagement in the region 
have developed through:  1) failed multilateral negotiations aimed at 
securing a generalized trade agreement with the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), and 2) recent bilateral trading agreements 
established with individual Asian nations, including Malaysia.  
 
                                                      
11 
 WON-MOG CHOI, “LIKE PRODUCTS” IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW xix (2003). 
12
  Javier Delgado Rivera, The EU-Malaysia FTA: An Overdue Assignment, NEW EUROPE, 
Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.neurope.eu/article/eu-malaysia-fta-overdue-assignment. 
13 
 Id. 
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A.  Political Disputes Undermined the EU’s Engagement with ASEAN  
 In late 2010, the EU abandoned its attempts to forge an overall trade 
deal with Southeast Asia as a trading bloc through its negotiations with 
ASEAN.14   Publicly, the EU asserted that “different levels of economic 
development within the 10-member alliance” contributed to the stalemate.15  
Many diplomats present at the negotiations, however, speculated that the 
breakdown in negotiations had more to do with the human rights record of 
military-ruled ASEAN member Myanmar.16  The EU maintains sanctions 
against Myanmar and requires that all signatories to any trade agreement 
with the European Community make commitments to uphold international 
human rights norms and enact certain democratic reforms as a precondition 
to trade.17  Disputes over either issue may have derailed negotiations.  
 In place of the failed ASEAN negotiations, the EU is attempting to 
reach Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with the individual ASEAN 
member-nations.  Already, the EU has signed an FTA with South Korea that 
many trade analysts are calling “the biggest bilateral deal in trade history”18 
and has opened trade negotiations with both Vietnam and Singapore.19 
B.  The EU Is Likely to Begin a Bilateral Trading Relationship with 
Malaysia  
 Recently, the European Commission (“EC”) president has shifted 
focus towards establishing a trade agreement with Malaysia.  Using the 
opportunity provided by the October 2010 Asia-Europe Meeting, Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mohd Najib Abdul Razak and EC President Jose Manuel 
Barosso announced the beginning of bilateral trade negotiations.20  
 Most reports indicate optimism concerning the future of negotiations 
between Malaysia and the EU.21  Malaysia is heavily reliant upon trade with 
the EU, which accounts for 11.2% of all of Malaysia’s trade and an annual 
                                                      
14
 Agence France-Presse, EU, Malaysia to Start Free Trade Talks, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,  
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/eu-malaysia-to-start-free-trade-talks-
20101006-166l7.html. 
15
 Id.  
16
 Id.  
17
 Id.; J. ORSTROM MOLLER, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: SHARING OF EXPERIENCES 350 (2008). 
18 John W. Miller, EU, Malaysia Launch Trade Deal, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 5, 2010, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/10/05/eu-malaysia-announce-free-trade-deal/. 
19
 France-Presse, supra note 14. 
20
 Agence France-Presse, EU, Malaysia Kick Off Free Trade Talks, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA, 
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/1085334/1/html. 
21
 Jackon Sawatan, Malaysia and EU to Begin FTA Talks in December, Says Najib, BERNAMA, 
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsbusiness.php?id=532979. 
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inflow of $13.6 billion. 22   The EU similarly desires a stable economic 
relationship with Malaysia to ensure competitive access to Southeast Asia, 
as compared to China, which has already signed a trade agreement with 
ASEAN.23  Thus, both parties have an economic and political interest in a 
timely and successful conclusion to trade negotiations. 
 Despite the above-mentioned potential for a successful trade deal 
between Malaysia and the EU, a controversial policy threatens to derail the 
negotiations:  the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (“RED”).24  The EU’s 
RED policy mandates that 20% of all energy used in the EU come from 
renewable energy sources and grants an excise tax exemption to any energy 
source counted towards that 20% target.25  It additionally mandates that by 
2020, the EU must derive 10% of its energy from biofuels.26  However, only 
biofuels that emit 35% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels count 
towards the 10% goal and thereby qualify for RED tax incentives.27 
 The controversy surrounding the policy stems from the fact that 
European scientists indicate that rapeseed oil biofuel, most of which is 
produced domestically, qualifies to be counted towards the 10% target 
because it emits approximately 38% less greenhouse gas than fossil fuels.28  
In contrast, scientists have determined that palm oil biofuel, which the EU 
imports largely from Malaysia, emits about 19% less greenhouse gas than 
traditional fossil fuels, leaving it far below the level required to qualify for 
RED’s excise tax exemption.29  Malaysian palm oil producers argue that this 
determination renders palm oil “virtually unmarketable” within the EU 
member states because, without the RED tax benefit, palm oil would be 
more expensive than both fossil fuels and comparable domestically produced 
biofuels.30 





 Id.; Le Tian, China, ASEAN Sign Trade Agreement, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 15, 2007, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/15/content_783185.htm. 
24
 In addition to resolving disputes concerning the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive, several major 
issues will need to be addressed over the course of the negotiations between the EU and Malaysia.  These 
will include issues such as intellectual property rights, government procurement, and sustainable 
development.  International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, EU and Malaysia Kick Off 
FTA Talks, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 7, 2010, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/86
149/. 
25
 FREDRIK ERIXON, GREEN PROTECTIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW EUROPE’S BIOFUELS 
POLICY AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE VIOLATE WTO COMMITMENTS 21 (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l 
Political Econ. ed., 2009). 
26 Alan Swinbank, EU Policies on Bioenergy and Their Potential Clash with the WTO, J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 60(3), 485-86 (2009). 
27 Id.  
28
 ERIXON, supra note 25, at 29.  
29 Id. 
30
 Rivera, supra note 12. 
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 Due to the RED’s one-sided effect, Malaysia considers the EU policy 
nothing more than an example of self-interested “green protectionism.”31  
Green protectionism, according to Fredrik Erixon, the father of the concept, 
is the practice of “adding non-environmental objectives that are 
discriminatory, or overtly trade restrictive in intent and/or effect, to 
environmental policy.”32  Some Malaysian producers see the RED’s 35% 
emissions reduction requirement as an example of an arbitrary 
environmental standard included in the policy only because of its benefit to 
domestically produced rapeseed at the expense of imported Malaysian palm 
oil.33  
 Due to increasing accusations that the RED is being used in a 
protectionist manner, the Malaysian government has received a number of 
demands from palm oil producers to resolve the issue through a WTO suit.34  
While the Malaysian government often suggests it may file such a suit, it has 
not yet chosen to do so.35  Nevertheless, commentators have predicted that a 
WTO panel will likely side with Malaysia if it does challenge the EU’s 
measure. 36   The reasoning behind these predictions stems from a 
conventional understanding of the WTO’s basic free trade tenets:  that if a 
foreign product looks like a domestic product and serves the same purpose 
as a domestic product, then it ought not be sanctioned or taxed differently 
from that domestic product.37  Because rapeseed oil and palm oil are virtually 
indistinguishable in terms of their physical characteristics and functions, 
some commentators conclude the WTO will attempt to allow Malaysian 
palm oil to compete openly and freely in Europe by demanding a repeal of 
the EU’s RED.  The WTO will likely deem the RED policy an arbitrary 
imposition into the functioning of the free market and a restriction on 
consumer choice.38  
 This type of reasoning concerning “like products,” which 
unrelentingly favors increased consumer choice and free competition in 
foreign markets, has historically functioned well for the WTO and its 
member nations as a firewall against protectionist policies that have 
threatened the global trading system and international stability. 39   The 
                                                      
31
 ERIXON, supra note 25, at 2. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 29. 
34
 Adnan, supra note 9. 
35
 Sawatan, supra note 21. 
36
 Rivera, supra note 12. 
37
  Adnan, supra note 9.  
38
  Id. 
39
  World Trade Organization, The System Helps to Keep the Peace, Sept. 18, 2011, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm. 
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following section suggests, nevertheless, that it is time it be reconsidered.  
Today’s international market is increasingly complex and deeply influenced 
by a host of social, environmental, political, and economic factors.  Each of 
these market forces is, however, almost entirely overlooked by the WTO’s 
conventional reasoning, which instead myopically focuses only on the 
consumer’s perception of the product and the service it provides to that 
consumer.  Such a focus not only fails to promote a modern and effective 
system of free trade, but is also counterproductive to the protection of 
comparative advantage.  
III. TRADITIONAL “LIKENESS” DETERMINATIONS ARE INADEQUATE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF AN EU-MALAYSIA WTO SUIT 
 Since its inception, the WTO has concerned itself with protecting free 
and fair competition between “like” products in the international arena.  It 
has never, however, explicitly laid out a definition of what constitutes 
“likeness.”  As a result, the organization historically has struggled to 
establish rational or consistent methods for determining “like products.”  
Although a few methods of comparison now dominate the analysis, they are 
largely inappropriate for, and inapplicable to, an effective analysis of 
Malaysia’s proposed suit.   
A. The WTO Panels Have Developed Two Primary Methods for 
Determining Likeness in Response to a Lack of Consensus or 
Guidance from International Trade Policymakers 
 Following World War II, in an attempt to build safeguards into the 
international trading system to prevent unrestrained protectionism and the 
risk of another global economic downturn, the United States proposed to its 
major trading partners the establishment of a treaty on global tariff.40  The 
United States’ proposal became the basis for the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), which twenty-three countries signed and 
implemented in 1948. 41   The GATT then became the basis of the 
international trading system for nearly forty-seven years and is still included 
amongst the treaties that govern the WTO and its member nations.  It is also 
the bedrock of one of the most basic premises of international trade law:  
“like products” in international commerce should not be treated differently 
                                                      
40
 NARLIKAR, supra note 1, at 10. 
41 Id. at 15. 
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simply because of their nation of origin.42   Various formulations of this 
proposition are found throughout the text of the GATT itself.43 
 However, soon after its creation, an increasingly globalized and 
complex international trading system demanded more than the GATT could 
provide.  One element missing from the GATT, for example, was a means of 
enforcing its non-discrimination provisions. 44   A formal enforcement 
mechanism for GATT non-discrimination provisions would not exist until 
the creation of the WTO and its 1995 Understanding on Rules and Procedure 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), which established, among 
another things, an international arbitration system to ensure compliance with 
international trade regulations among WTO members.45  
 The DSU system provides that, if the principle of non-discrimination 
has allegedly been violated, a WTO member may file a complaint with the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). 46   The DSB makes the final 
decision concerning the outcome of the trade dispute.47  However, the DSB 
does not actually hear or review the arguments presented by the parties in 
dispute.48  Instead, it convenes a panel that engages in a type of hearing 
known as an examination.49  Based on the examination results, WTO panels 
issue reports and recommendations to the DSB (which the DSB nearly 
always adopts).50  Panel recommendations concerning a party found to be in 
violation of WTO policy range from a mandate requiring that a violating 
country alter its domestic policy (to come into compliance with the WTO’s 
non-discrimination principles) to authorization for the aggrieved WTO 
member to engage in trade retaliation (sometimes the panel gives 
authorization even for the imposition of sanctions). 51   The WTO panel 
recommendations not only bind the disputing parties but also influence 
                                                      
42
 Hudec, supra note 3.  
43
 GATT, Article I, Paragraph I reads, for example, that “any advantage . . . granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other 
contracting parties.”  GATT, Article III, Paragraph 2 also explains that “[t]he products of the territory of 
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly 
or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or 
indirectly, to like domestic products.”  Similarly, Article III, Paragraph 4 mandates that “[t]he products of 
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be 
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin.”  
44
  NARLIKAR, supra note 1, at 50. 
45
  Id. at 130. 
46   Id. at 135-36. 
47
  Id. at 137. 
48
  Id. 
49
  Id. at 133-35. 
50
  Id. at 50. 
51
  Id. 
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WTO trade policy and subsequent panel decisions through a form of de facto 
precedent.52 
 Despite decades of precedent developed by WTO panels that have 
been tasked with interpreting and enforcing the GATT for its signatories, the 
concept of a “like product” remains poorly defined.53  In fact, many WTO 
panelists and commentators agree that while the question of “likeness” arises 
in a majority of WTO panel decisions, “the definition of [a] like or directly 
competitive or substitutable product . . . is yet to be settled.”54  Nevertheless, 
there are two dominant methods to determine “likeness” that the WTO 
would likely apply in Malaysia’s proposed suit. 
 The first approach compares the physical characteristics of the 
products.55  In other words, if products look alike, then they are alike for the 
sake of a physical characteristics-based determination of “likeness.”56  A 
WTO panel decision explored this method in the Japanese Alcoholic 
Beverages case.  Japanese Alcoholic Beverages panel considered whether 
vodka could be considered “like” the Japanese distilled spirit shōchū.57  In 
determining “likeness,” the panel reasoned that “products having no 
substantial noticeable differences in physical characteristics ought to be 
considered like.”58  Thus, since vodka and shōchū are both “white/clean 
spirits made of similar raw materials,”59 the panel held they are “like” and 
should be treated similarly.60 
 The second dominant method of determining “likeness” focuses on 
products’ end uses when purchased by the consumer.  Accordingly, if one 
product serves the same purpose as another, the products are considered 
substitutable and, therefore, “like” one another.61  For example, in EEC-
Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, the panel found that “vegetable proteins 
and denatured skim milk powder were like”62 because they both shared a 
                                                      
52
 MICHAEL LANG, JUDITH HERDIN & INEST HOFBAUER, WTO AND DIRECT TAXATION 62 (2005). 
53
  Marco Bronkers & Natalie McWelis, Rethinking the “Like Product” Definition in WTO 
Anti-Dumping Law, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1999). 
54
  CHOI, supra note 11, at xix; see also Hudec, supra note 3; Weihuan Zhou, Non-Discrimination 
and the Accordion of ‘Like Product’, July 15, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000173.  
55  Hudec, supra note 3. 
56




 Report of the Panel, Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines 
and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216 (Nov. 10, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1988) [hereinafter 
Japan Wine].  
59
 Id.  
60
 Id.  
61
 Hudec, supra note 3, at 103. 
62
 Report of the Panel, EEC – Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, L/4599 (Mar. 14, 1978), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 49 (1978).  
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common use:  a “protein source [used] . . . in feeding stuffs for animals.”63  
Similarly, in Spanish Coffee, the panel found that all varieties of coffee are 
“like” because they share a “well defined and single [end use] . . . 
drinking.”64  
 Both of the above-described methods focus on the consumer of the 
good in question.  A physical characteristics method considers how a 
product looks on a store shelf, while the end use method considers for what 
purpose the customer would purchase the product.  As a result of the focus 
on the consumer, however, these traditional methods tend to exclude from 
consideration important differences in production methods and non-
consumer-based market interactions.   
B.  Neither an “End Use” nor a “Physical Characteristics” Analysis Can 
Effectively Address the Relationship Between Palm Oil and Rapeseed 
Oil in the Context of a Malaysian Suit  
 An analysis using these traditional methods of determining “likeness” 
would indicate that Malaysia does indeed have a compelling case that two 
like products (palm oil and rapeseed oil) are being treated differently.65  
Applying a physical characteristics model, the two products are almost 
indistinguishable.  Both are yellow vegetable oils that could easily be 
mistaken for each other or even for other types of vegetable oil such as corn 
oil.  Further, both generally serve one of two purposes:  energy production 
(in the form of biofuel) or food.  Therefore, under either a physical 
characteristics or end use analysis, the two products should be considered 
“like.” 
 These analyses, however, mask real differences between the products 
that should interest and concern both the global trading system and national 
regulators.66  Considering just the case of rapeseed and palm oil, both the 
physical characteristics and end use approaches ignore, among other things, 
the different levels of greenhouse gas emitted by the burning of the oils,67 
the different amount of land required to grow them, the differing costs of 
production, and their differing energy densities.68  Each of these factors, 
however, clearly evidence important differences between the products that 
                                                      
63
 Id.  
64
 Report of the Panel, Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135 (June 11, 1981), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 102 (1981) [hereinafter Spanish Coffee]. 
65
  Rivera, supra note 12. 
66
  Id. 
67
  ERIXON, supra note 25. 
68
  Id. 
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pertain to the development of an efficient system of international trade and 
competition.   
Consider, for example, the land use factor.  Two products that serve 
an identical function but require different levels of land for their growth, 
development, or production would be determined to be “like” under an “end 
use” analysis.  Such a determination would make it impossible, within the 
WTO’s guidelines, for a nation to incentivize products that make effective, 
efficient, and sustainable use of land, thereby discouraging innovation and 
competition in that arena and instead encouraging a wasteful use of property.  
 Traditional “likeness” determinations thus preclude the WTO from 
achieving its goal of encouraging optimally efficient use of the world’s 
resources.  Therefore, in the context of the presently proposed Malaysian 
suit, the WTO panel ought to consider “likeness” determinations that can 
more effectively address these potential vectors of comparison.  The 
following section suggests that an economic likeness determination may be 
able to do so.  
IV. AN ECONOMIC DETERMINATION OF “LIKENESS” SHOULD BE USED BY 
THE WTO IN CONSIDERING MALAYSIA’S PROPOSED DISCRIMINATION 
SUIT 
 In his text, “Like Products” in International Trade Law, Won-Mog 
Choi makes a compelling case for the proposition that the WTO should 
apply a “market-oriented analysis” when considering which products should 
be viewed as “like” or competitive within the meaning of the GATT.69  An 
economic analysis, Choi argues, would not only coincide with the goals of 
the treaty but could provide “predictability and consistency” 70  to the 
decisions of WTO panels.   
The following section provides:  1) a useful method of applying an 
economic or market-based “likeness” determination, 2) an application of an 
economic likeness determination to the facts of Malaysia’s proposed suit, 
concluding that palm oil and rapeseed oil are not “like” and, therefore, that 
Malaysia’s discrimination suit should fail before the WTO DSB, and 3) an 
overview of the benefits of an economic likeness determination in the 
proposed Malaysian suit. 
 
                                                      
69
 CHOI, supra note 11, at xxi.  
70
 Id. at xix. 
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A. A Useful Means of Employing an “Economic Likeness” Test Is to 
Calculate a Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand Between the Products 
in Question  
To some extent, the WTO panels have followed Choi’s 
recommendations for a more economically and market-focused “likeness” 
analysis.71  Recent panel decisions have included certain economic analyses 
in their decision-making.72  For example, in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages, 
the panel noted: 
[T]he decisive criterion in order to determine whether two 
products are directly competitive or substitutable is whether 
they have common end-uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity 
or substitution . . . . The panel noted that the extent to which two 
products are competitive in economics is measured by the 
responsiveness of the demand for one product to the change in 
the demand for the other product . . . . Ideally, one would like to 
see the test for the relationship between the price of one product 
and the demand for another, all things being equal.73 
The type of competition analysis provided by the Japanese Alcoholic 
Beverages panel is known as a “cross-price elasticity of demand analysis.”74  
Similarly, in Korea Alcoholic Beverages, the panel relied “heavily upon the 
merit of [a] Dodwell Study” that was “a cross-price elasticity of demand 
analysis” similar to the one used in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages.75 
 The cross-price elasticity of demand between two goods is the level to 
which the demand for one product will increase due to the increased price of 
another product.76  “Cross-price elasticity is [expressed mathematically by 
the following equation]: 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% 
     (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%77 
where Pj denotes the initial price of good j and Qi denotes the initial quantity 
of good i demanded.”78  The result
 
can be either positive or negative.  If 
έQiPj is positive, as a general matter, it indicates that “a higher price for good 
                                                      
71
 Id. at 22.  
72
 Id.  
73
 Japan Wine, supra note 58.  
74
 CHOI, supra note 11, at 12.  
75
 Id. at 26.  
76
 DAVID BESANKO, RONALD BRAEUTIGAM & MICHAEL J. GIBBS, MICROECONOMICS 52 (2010). 
77
   WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, MICROECONOMICS 107 (2011).  
78
   BESANKO ET AL., supra note 76. 
MARCH 2012 MALAYSIA’S WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION CHALLENGE 411 
 
j increases the quantity of good i demanded [and, therefore,] goods i and j 
are demand substitutes.”79  If έQiPj is negative then, as a general matter, “a 
higher price for good j decreases the quantity of good i demanded [and, 
therefore,] goods i and j are demand supplements.”80  A positive result, then, 
would indicate that the two products are competitive with one another and 
are “like” as far as the market is concerned, while a negative result would 
indicate just the opposite—“unlike” or non-competitive products.  
 The WTO has not, however, accepted that a positive ratio alone is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that two products are “like” or competitive.  
The panel in Chilean Alcoholic Beverages, for example, found “a cross-price 
elasticity of demand for pisco with respect to whisky . . . to be 0.26.”81  Such 
a ratio, they explained, was: 
a “low” level of elasticity [but] not necessarily fatal to a claim 
of direct competitiveness or substitutability, although a high 
coefficient of cross-price elasticity would be important 
evidence to demonstrate that products are directly competitive 
provided that the quality of the statistical analysis is high.82 
Thus, while Chilean Alcoholic Beverages does seem to stand for the 
proposition that a 0.26 demand elasticity is too low, it does not provide an 
indication of what is “high enough” to indicate “likeness” or substitutability 
within the meaning of the GATT.83 
Two WTO Panel decisions, however, do offer some guidance as to 
what level of elasticity would be high enough.  The first is Japanese 
Alcoholic Beverages. 84   The panel in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages 
indicated that “between 4 and 10[%] of consumers would switch from 
shōchū to whisky or vice versa respectively if one was not available any 
more.” 85   It went on to note that “a 10[%] switch is a significant 
substitution.”86  Thus, an upper bound of at least a 10% switching rate has 
                                                      
79
 Id.  
80
 Id.  
81
 CHOI, supra note 11, at 28. 
82
 Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/R, WT/DS110/R (Jan. 12, 2000), 
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, 303 [hereinafter 
Chilean Alcoholic Beverages].  
83
 Id.  
84
  It is relevant to note that in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages, the panel did not, strictly speaking, 
engage in the above described cross-price elasticity of demand analysis.  Instead, it relied on a market 
research study, which asked consumers whether they would purchase whiskey if shōchū were no longer 
available to them.  This type of analysis is referred to as a “non availability analysis” and has been 
criticized by some as unlikely to occur in the real market and tending to exaggerate the switching rate.  




   Id.  
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been found by one WTO panel to be meaningful in a “likeness” or 
“substitutability” analysis.87  Similarly, although perhaps less helpfully, the 
panel in Canada Periodical explained that “perfect substitutability [a ratio of 
1.00] is not necessary” for a determination of “competition” or “likeness” 
between two products.88 
 Based on this precedent, the WTO should adopt a cross-price 
elasticity of demand analysis as a means of determining whether two 
products should be considered “like.”  The analyses should consider positive 
ratios lower than 0.26 to be inconsequential and those greater than 1.00 to be 
meaningful to an assessment of “likeness.”  Such a method ensures that the 
WTO addresses discrimination between products that compete as a matter of 
empirical and economic reality, as opposed to those products that only 
appear to compete in the mind of a consumer or WTO panelist.  The 
following section conducts such an analysis in the context of Malaysia’s 
proposed suit.  
B.  A Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand Analysis of Malaysian Palm Seed 
Oil and European Rapeseed Oil Indicates a Negative Demand Ratio  
The following cross-price elasticity of demand analysis concerning 
Malaysian palm oil and European rapeseed oil only considers data from 
2008 and 2009.  Prior to these years, both the rapeseed and palm oil energy 
markets were still vastly out-competed by oil and natural gas and were in 
fledgling stages of development, making data from these years less 
predictive of future events in this market.89  After December 2009, however, 
the RED had been adopted and was already in force.90  Thus, including the 
2010 data would fail to achieve the goal of considering the competitive 
relationship of the products outside the influence of the challenged policy 
(EU RED).91 
                                                      
87
 Id. 
88  Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R and Corr.1 
(July 30, 1997), as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, 481.  
89
  JOSE GOLDEMBERG & OSWALDO  LUCON, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 170 (2010).  
90
 CINNAMON PIÑON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: EU AND US APPROACHES 299 
(2010).  
91  Japan Wine, supra note 58. 
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In 2008, the EU imported the following levels of palm oil from 
Malaysia: 
 
2008 EU IMPORTS OF MALAYSIAN PALM OIL (MILLION TONNES)92 
 
June 2008 156,080 
July 2008 171,018 
August 2008 197,181 
September 2008 163,489 
October 2008 232,106 
November 2008 177,999 
December 2008 244,189 
 
During the same months, the following crude rapeseed oil prices were 
reported in U.S. dollars per metric ton:93 
 
2008 CRUDE RAPESEED OIL (U.S.D./TON)94 
 
June 2008 1,639.55 
July 2008 1,736.46 
August 2008 1,467.67 
September 2008 1,352.99 
 
                                                      
92
 Monthly Palm Oil Trade Statistics, MALAYSIAN PALM OIL COUNCIL, 
http://www.mpoc.org.my/Monthly_Palm_Oil_Trade_Statistics.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
93 It is perhaps relevant to note here that EU imports are reported in metric tons or ‘tonnes’ (a unit of 
mass equal to 2,205 lbs), a slightly different measurement than the U.S. price, which is reported in ‘tons’ (a 
unit of mass equal to 2,000 lbs).  However, this is irrelevant to a cross-price elasticity demand analysis 
which does not compare price and demand in absolute terms.   
94
 Rapeseed Oil Monthly Price, INDEX MUNDI, 
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=rapeseedoil&months=60 (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2012). 
 
414 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 2 
 
Thus, 2008 provides the following cross-price elasticity of demand ratios for 
palm oil and rapeseed oil:        
       
DATES ELASTICITY RESULT 
June-July 1.161920289295 Demand Substitute96 
July-August -0.988319566 Demand Supplement97 
August-September 2.186766741 Demand Substitute 
September-
October 
-2.796077705 Demand Supplement 
October-November  3.5405759488 Demand Substitute 
 
Because the elasticity of demand between palm oil demand and rapeseed 
price in 2008 vacillated so drastically month-to-month, these results are not 
terribly instructive.  However, taken as a whole, the 2008 data points 
indicate a weak demand substitute of +0.140569088. 
 In 2009, the EU imported the following levels of palm oil from 
Malaysia:98 
 














                                                      
95
 Given by:  
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%(171018-156080 /156080i) x 100%  14938/15608   0.0957073296 
  (∆Pj /Pj) x 100% (1736.46-1639.55j /1639.55) x 100%   96.91/1639.55   0.059107682 
For full cross-price elasticity calculations, see infra Appendix A. 
96
 Because the result is positive, it indicates a “demand substitute” relationship.  See BESANKO ET AL., 
supra note 76.  
97
 Because the result is negative, it indicates a “demand supplement” relationship.  See id.  
98
   Monthly Palm Oil Trade Statistics, supra note 92.  
99
  Id. 
January 2009 142,246 
February 2009 114,973 
March 2009 152,589 
April 2009 177,412 
May 2009 140,226 
June 2009 148,183 
July 2009 161,066 
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During the same months, the following crude rapeseed oil prices were 
reported in U.S. Dollars per metric ton:  
 














Using the above-discussed formula, this information provides the following 
cross-price elasticity of demand ratios for palm oil and rapeseed oil in 2009: 
 
 
                                                      
100
  Rapeseed Oil Monthly Price, supra note 94. 
101
  Given by:  
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%(114973-142246 /142246i) x 100%-27273/142246- 0.19173123  
            (∆Pj /Pj) x 100    (767.78-840.72 /840.72) x 100%   -72.94/840.72     -0.08675897 
For full cross-price elasticity calculations, see infra Appendix A. 
January 2009 840.72 
February 2009 767.78 
March 2009 731.63 
April 2009 802.12 
May 2009 901.37 
June 2009 910.48 
July 2009 857.40 
August 2009  875.75 
September 2009 856.85 
October 2009 885.83 
November 2009 923.98 
DATE ELASTICITY OF 
DEMAND  
RESULT 
January-February 2.20993101 Demand Substitute 
February-March  -6.94865777 Demand Supplement 
March-April 16.8515229519 Demand Substitute 
April-May  -1.69396 Demand Supplement 
May-June 5.6144135 Demand Substitute 
June-July -1.491277723 Demand Supplement  
July-August -18.351817429 Demand Supplement 
August-September -22.62098045 Demand Supplement 
September-October 7.064577396 Demand Substitute 
October-November 2.704367613 Demand Substitute 
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As in 2008, there is a fair amount of variation from month-to-month; 
however, the data from 2009 provides a stronger overall trend.  Taken as a 
whole, the 2009 data points indicate a strong demand supplement of  
-1.666189732543077. 
 Overall, the data from June 2008 to December 2009 indicate a 
negative cross-price elasticity of demand ratio between palm oil and 
rapeseed oil.  It seems, therefore, that two products that are commonly 
considered competitive in the European energy commodities market may 
actually supplement each other’s demand.   
 How can this seemingly paradoxical result be understood?  While a 
number of factors influence the relationship between these two products, 
researchers have identified “indirect land use change” as particularly 
significant, and it may explain the above results.102  Indirect land use change 
is a term used generally in the context of biofuel production and refers to “a 
different use [for land]—such as food or feed production—[that] took place 
on land used for energy crop cultivation and is thereby displaced.” 103  
Generally speaking, indirect land use change can occur because, “to the 
extent that demand remains for the food or feed previously produced on 
[the] land [in question], its production is likely to shift elsewhere.” 104  
However, according to a study conducted by E4tech,105 because historic data 
indicate that the demand for food crops in the EU will remain relatively 
stable, it is a fair assumption that demand for biodiesel in Europe will result 
in more rapeseed production and planting, but that the traditional 
displacement of food cropland for energy production is not likely to occur. 
 The reason stems from the fact that “oilseed rape achieves low gross 
margins relative to cereal [or food] crops” 106  as demonstrated in the 
following chart: 
 
CROP GROSS MARGIN (£/HA)107 
Feed Wheat 405 
Feed Barley 248 
Rapeseed 130 
Field Beans 254 
                                                      
102
  E4tech, Indirect Land Use Change Impacts of Oilseed Rape for Biodiesel (unpublished, 2010), 
available at http://www.ilucstudy.com/files%5CRapeseed_AnalysisV2.pdf.  
103
  RENATE SCHUBERT ET AL., FUTURE BIOENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE 172 (2010). 
104
  Id.  
105
  E4tech is an international business consultancy focused on sustainable energy.  E4tech, supra note 
102.   
106
  Id. at 6.  
107
  Id. 
MARCH 2012 MALAYSIA’S WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION CHALLENGE 417 
 
Thus, from a purely economic standpoint, the likelihood of rapeseed 
displacing mainstream food crops is quite low.  However, the E4tech study 
indicates that rapeseed does compete well in the area of “break crop” 
selection.108  A “break crop” is a crop grown in between fields of cereal and 
food to ensure a varied planting pattern and to replenish the soil.109  Because 
rapeseed has “relatively higher nitrogen transfer . . . and [relatively better] . . . 
crop cover  [to] . . . protect against soil erosion,” it is likely that “increasing 
demand for biodiesel . . . will lead to oilseed rape,” outcompeting other break 
crops such as sunflower, potatoes, sugar beet, peas, etc.110  
 The E4tech study’s authors took particular note of the effect that 
rapeseed competition would have on domestic soy production.  For example, 
they concluded that every ton of rapemeal produced in Europe would result 
in the displacement of 0.605 tons of soybean.111  When combined with a 
projected increase of rapeseed production of “3.3 million hectares of 
additional oil-seed rape,” it results in approximately “6.4 Mtonnes of 
[displaced domestic] soy” production.112 
 After this displacing effect of increased rapeseed on soy, however, the 
competition to fill the European demand is not limited only to foreign soy 
producers.  In fact, according to E4tech predictions, “palm oil [is likely to] . . . 
replace the displaced soy” because it is less expensive as an import than 
soy.113  The “net result,” according to the study, “is that around 1.7 Mha of 
additional palm production will be required due to soy being displaced [by 
rapeseed demand for land and] it is assumed that this production will occur 
in Malaysia.” 114   It is through this indirect benefit granted to palm oil 
producers via soy displacement that rapeseed oil’s negative elasticity of 
demand ratios for palm oil can be partially explained.  It is also relevant to 
note that this effect is not unknown to palm oil producers.  The Malaysian 
Oil Palm Board, for example, released a report predicting that “due to the 
competitive price of palm oil vis-à-vis other competing oils such as soy oil . . . 
[i]t is forecasted  that about 10%-30% of the EU’s biodiesel requirement 
could come from palm oil by 2010.”115  
 
                                                      
108
  Id.  
109
  SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 103, at 172.  
110
  Id.  
111
  E4tech, supra note 102. 
112
  Id. 
113
  Id. 
114
  Id. 
115
  Mohd Basri Wahi et al., EU’s Renewable Energy Directive: Possible Implications on Malaysian 
Palm Oil Trade, 8(2) OIL PALM INDUSTRY ECON. J. 3 (2008). 
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C.  Only an “Economic Likeness” Analysis Can Meaningfully Address 
the Impact of Indirect Land Use Change in the Malaysian Case and 
Achieve the Goals of the WTO  
  Traditionally, a given product’s “likeness” to or substitutability for 
another product depends on the total set of products that could potentially 
substitute for the given product or the relevant market for comparison.  For 
example, in Korean Alcoholic Beverages, the panel found it difficult to 
establish a meaningful or realistic competitive relationship between two 
vodka-style drinks because it felt that the government policy in question 
might significantly affect the likelihood of “switching” or would 
“crystallize” a preference for one product or another in a given market.116  
Therefore, the panel suggested that an appropriate method of determining 
whether a product is “potential[ly] competitive or substitutab[le]” with 
another would be to “consider the nature of the competitive relationship in 
other markets . . . [or] a market that is relatively less affected by government 
policies.”117 
 In the case of palm and rapeseed oil, due to the high level of 
investment and political interest in both products, there are a significant 
number of data points available to the general public concerning the EU’s 
imports, Malaysian exports, and the relative price of the two products in the 
European market both before and after the implementation of RED.  Thus, 
there is no need to analogize the EU to a foreign market.  Nevertheless, the 
relationship between rapeseed oil and palm oil can meaningfully show how 
the market, used as a comparative data point, can significantly affect the 
outcome of a “likeness” analysis in a WTO lawsuit.  
 In analyzing Malaysia’s proposed suit, if one were to limit the 
“relevant market” to the EU, as demanded by traditional “likeness” 
comparisons that focus on protecting consumer choice in a domestic market, 
then a WTO panel would see rapeseed oil and palm oil as direct 
competitors. 118   However, by expanding the relevant marketplace to the 
entire globe, the peculiar positive and synergistic effect that domestic EU 
rapeseed oil production has on imported Malaysian palm oil through 
Brazilian soy presents itself more clearly.  In other words, a marketplace-
oriented price-elasticity analysis will achieve a more nuanced and useful 
                                                      
116
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understanding of the economic relationship between the two products.  It is 
only through an economic analysis of likeness that such a “de-bordering” of 
the WTO “likeness” comparisons can take place because market indicators, 
such as demand and price fluctuations in an increasingly globalized 
economy, are less and less concerned (if at all) with national boundaries or 
the “relevant market” as bounded and constituted by the minds or common 
sense of the WTO panelists.  
 The value of increased recognition of and reliance upon these market 
indicators by the WTO panelists addresses a fundamental aspiration housed 
in the GATT:  protecting comparative advantage.119  The rapeseed-soy-palm 
oil interaction highlighted by a cross-price elasticity of demand analysis can 
aid in recognizing the benefits of a market-based “likeness” determination.  
Using a more traditional method of determining the “likeness” of palm oil to 
rapeseed oil, it is almost a foregone conclusion that “likeness” would be 
found.  However, such a conclusion would encourage a European trade 
policy favoring the production of domestic soy functionally subsidizing, 
through international trade regulations, a crop that is more expensive and 
less energy efficient than its competitor—palm oil.120  Traditional indicators 
of “likeness” determinations, thus, can function against the vision of the 
GATT and discourage the optimal use of the world’s resources.   
 Defenders of traditional methods of “likeness” determinations may, 
however, voice a number of legitimate criticisms of a market-based 
determination.  While a market-based approach need not necessarily 
displace other types of analysis, it may be useful to address some potential 
concerns here. 
The “end use” or “consumer choice” theory, for example, showed its 
usefulness in the WTO’s Spanish Coffee decision.  Spanish Coffee 
concerned a 1979 Spanish decree, which established the following duties for 
unroasted non-decaffeinated coffee beans:121 
 
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION DUTY RATE 
Colombian Mild Free 
Other Mild Free 
Unwashed Arabica 7% ad. val. 
Robusta 7% ad. val. 
Other 7% ad. val. 
 
                                                      
119
 Id. at 26. 
120
  ERIXON, supra note 25.  
121
  Spanish Coffee, supra note 64, at 2.4.  
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Because “Spain’s imports of unroasted coffee from Brazil were constituted 
almost entirely of unwashed Arabica,” 122  the “representative of Brazil 
argued that [imposing] a 7[%] tariff on . . . unwashed Arabica and Robusta . . . 
while affording duty-free treatment to . . . other groups” was a violation of 
the WTO’s non-discrimination principles.123  The panel in Spanish Coffee 
agreed with the representative from Brazil, finding that all “unroasted, non-
decaffeinated coffee beans listed in the Spanish Customs Tariffs . . . [are] 
‘like products.’”124  
 The panel’s decision hinged largely on its observation that “unroasted 
coffee was mainly, if not exclusively, sold in the form of blends, combining 
various types of coffee.”125  Thus, Spain’s tariff distinctions meant absolutely 
nothing to the end-user or purchaser of the coffee.126  The “end-use [of coffee 
is] universally regarded as a well-defined and single product,” not five 
different products as explained by the Spanish Coffee decree.127 
 Supporters of an “end use” or “consumer choice” theory of likeness 
might point to the Spanish Coffee decision as evidence that only through the 
eyes of a consumer can the true “likeness” of a product be determined.  A 
market-based approach, in contrast, could inappropriately find competition 
between the unroasted beans in Spanish Coffee because of factors that are 
irrelevant to consumers in the market, such as the price of labor in the region 
where a particular bean is produced in or the comparative cost of crop 
insurance for different methods of coffee farming.  While such a view is 
certainly not without merit, a market-based analysis would not entirely forgo 
consideration of consumer choice.  In fact, consumer demand represents one 
of the major variables influencing the price of a product in a cross-price 
elasticity determination.  However, a market-based model has the flexibility 
to consider not only consumer demand but also overall production costs.   
While a critic might find error with a WTO panel finding that coffee 
beans ground and blended together are in fact not “like products” (to the 
consumer, it could be argued, they are literally the same product), it might 
still be the case that, because of the farming or production methods used to 
produce a particular type of product, similar financial or governmental 
regulations simply should not be applied across the board.  In a similar vein, 
supporters of a “physical characteristics” method of determining “likeness” 
might criticize the tendency of a market-based analysis to fabricate 
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 Id. at 2.11. 
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competition by pointing to the simple fact that “virtually all products have at 
least a minimum cross-price elasticity with one another.”128  For example, it 
has been well established that “the demand of sugar will be increased as a 
result of the rising price of tea . . . . Indeed, sugar is related to tea indirectly 
through coffee.” 129   An advocate of the physical characteristics method 
might argue that an economic likeness theorist would extrapolate from that 
interconnectedness to consider sugar and tea to be “like products.”  A 
physical characteristics analysis simply could not allow such a determination.  
 Again, each of the above criticisms of a market-based approach is 
appropriate.  However, the risk may be overstated.  The WTO panelists have 
established a minimum level of price elasticity required for a finding of 
likeness.  Recall, for example, the panel’s decision in Chilean Alcoholic 
Beverages, finding that +0.26 was simply too low of a ratio to indicate 
likeness.130   
Standards, such as the one hinted at in Chilean Alcoholic Beverages, 
would likely address the concern that a market-based analysis would be too 
likely to find economic connections between products that have no 
meaningful interaction. 131   Should this eventuality result, however, the 
rewards outweigh the risk.  It is a far lesser sin to take into account too much 
economic and market-based information when making a decision concerning 
international trade, with the result of finding competition and interactions 
that are not obvious to the average consumer, than to ignore meaningful 
information for the sake of a consumer’s common sense consideration.  
 Consider, for example, the way that a physical characteristics or 
consumer choice/end use trade analyst might approach the case of a 
challenge to differential treatment of organically-fed cruelty-free beef and 
traditionally-fed and raised beef products.  Organically and traditionally fed 
ground beef have nearly imperceptible physical distinctions—certainly no 
more different than vodka and shōchū.  Further, their end use is precisely the 
same—a protein rich food source.  Thus, traditional methods of “likeness” 
determinations might find “likeness” between these two products despite the 
real differences that exist between them in calculating public health concerns, 
costs to the environment, land use requirements, and production costs.  Each 
of these factors, however, significantly and meaningfully affects price and 
demand and, therefore, must necessarily be included in an economic market-
based analysis.  
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D.  The WTO Should Adopt Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand as a Means 
of Determining “Likeness” in Future Non-Discrimination Suits  
Although Malaysia’s proposed suit specifically highlights the ways in 
which a cross-price elasticity of demand analysis can enhance the efficiency 
of the international trading system by elucidating economic interconnections 
that might otherwise go unnoticed, the usefulness of such an approach 
extends beyond this particular case and, if adopted, would provide the WTO 
member states with a number of institutional and economic advantages.  
First, it establishes a level of predictability in WTO rulings and the 
environment in which global trade occurs.  Instead of simply deferring to the 
judgment of a hypothetical consumer concocted in the mind of a WTO 
panelist, potential trading partners and/or WTO claimants can predict, in 
advance, the outcome of a WTO challenge by applying a cross-price 
elasticity of demand formula themselves.  Further, the objective cross-price 
elasticity of demand analysis allows domestic policymakers to craft 
legislation that meets their needs without fear of running afoul of the often 
unpredictable WTO jurisprudence concerning non-discrimination.  
Second, this approach encourages faith in the institution of the WTO 
itself.  Even in the international trading system, economic actors can engage 
in a certain amount of forum shopping concerning their preferred methods of 
regulation.132  If the WTO system ceases to function for more sophisticated 
market users, such as the EU, they may begin to seek alternative methods of 
engaging in and structuring international trade.  The evolution of the trade 
partnership between Malaysia and the EU provides an example of this 
phenomenon.  While the EU initially engaged with ASEAN as a bloc, it 
chose instead to form favorable trade relationships with ASEAN countries 
through individual FTAs after political disputes between the two 
organizations prevented an economically efficient partnership from 
forming.133  While not a perfect analog to the institution of the WTO, the 
EU’s strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN countries indicates that it and other 
countries will find alternatives to WTO constraints if the WTO panels do not 
conform their decisions to the ideals and demands of the market participants, 
as expressed through basic market indicators such as price-demand ratios.  
Those users may instead avoid altogether the constraints of the WTO by 
negotiating their own trading rules through bilateral trade agreements.  Such 
                                                      
132
  Albert Fishlow, Brazil: FTA or FTAA or WTO?, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES 
AND PRIORITIES 277 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004). 
133
  Miller, supra note 18. 
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a result could threaten the legitimacy of the WTO, reduce the efficiency of 
the global market, and decrease global productivity.  
V.  CONCLUSION  
 The danger of capitalism, as articulated by some of its critics, is a 
tendency to “reduce all human interactions to commodity-relations of 
universal equivalency.”134  However, this unrelenting impulse to reduce all 
information and interactions to a market-useful value affords a market-
oriented approach the ability to address effectively a host of human and 
economic concerns.  The Malaysian case provides the WTO with a useful 
and appropriate opportunity to reconsider its traditional analysis concerning 
“likeness” and product comparison to confront more appropriately the 
challenges facing the international trading system. 
                                                      
134
  Martin E. Rosenberg, Dynamic and Thermodynamic Tropes of the Subject in Freud and in 
Deleuze and Guattari, in 4 POSTMODERN CULTURE 1 (1993). 
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APPENDIX A 
2008 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND CALCULATIONS 
June – July 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (171018-156080 / 156080)  x 100%  14938 / 15608       0.0957073296   
   (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (1736.46-1639.55 / 1639.55) x 100%  96.91 / 1639.55       0.0591076820 
 
July – August  
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (197181-171018 /171018)  x 100%     26163/171018     0.15298389600  
    (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (1467.67-1736.46 /1736.46) x 100%  -268.79/1736.46        -0.1547919330 
 
August – September 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (163489-197181 / 197181)   x 100%  -33692/197181    -0.1708683900 
       (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%     1352.99-1467.67 / 1467.67) x 100%  -114.68/1467.67         -0.078137456 
 
September – October 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%    (232106-163489 / 163489)   x 100%  68617 / 163489      0.419704078  
       (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%      (1149.9-1352.99 / 1352.99)  x 100%  -203.09 / 1352.99      -0.150104583 
 
October – November 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%    (177999-232106 / 232106)   x 100%  -54107 / 232106   -0.23311331891 
       (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%    (1074.19 -1149.9 / 1149.9)  x 100%  -75.71 / 1149.9           -0.06584050800 
2009 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND CALCULATIONS 
January – February  
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% (114973-142246  / 142246)  x 100%   -27273 / 142246  -0.19173123  
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (767.78-840.72 / 840.72)  x 100%       -72.94 / 840.72       -0.08675897 
 
February – March 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% (152589-114973 / 114973)  x 100% 37616 / 114974  0.3271692095  
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (731.63-767.78 / 767.78)  x 100%           -36.15 / 767.78   -0.0470838000 
 
March – April 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% (177412-152589 / 15289)  x 100%  24823 / 15289    1.62358558440709 
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (802.12-731.63 / 731.63) x 100%           70.49 / 731.63         0.09634651948307 
 
April – May 
έQiPj =  (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% (140226-177412 / 177412)  x 100%  -37186 / 177412 -0.20960250715847  
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%      (901.37-802.12 / 802.12)  x 100%          99.23 / 802.12         0.12373460330125 
 
May – June 
έQiPj =  (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (148183-140226 / 140226)  x 100%  7957 / 140226  0.056744113074608  
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (910.48-901.37 / 901.37) x 100%          9.11 / 901.37           0.010106837369782 
 
June – July  
έQiPj =  (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (161066-148183 / 148183) x 100%   12883 / 148183  0.0869397974126590 
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%       (857.40-910.48  / 910.48) x 100%          -53.08 / 910.48   -0.058298919251384 
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July – August  
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (97805-161066/161066) x 100% -63261/161066  -0.392764456806520 
 (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (875.75-857.40 / 857.40) x 100%          18.35/857.40         0.021411901983664 
 
August – September 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%   (145854-97805 / 97805) x 100%    48049 / 97805  0.4912734522774910  
            (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%  (856.85-875.75 / 875.75) x 100%        -18.9 / 875.75        -0.021581501570083 
 
September – October 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%   (180332-145554 / 14554) x 100%  34778 / 145554  0.23893537793533  
             (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%      (885.83-856.85 / 856.85) x 100%         28.98 / 856.85       0.033821555698197 
 
October – November 
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%   (201335-180332 / 180332) x 100%  21003 / 180332  0.116468513630415  
           (∆Pj /Pj) x 100%   (923.98-885.83 / 885.83) x 100%   38.19 / 885.83         0.043066954155989 
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APPENDIX B 
COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VEGETABLE OILS  
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  Erich E Dumelin, The Environmental Impact of Palm Oil and Other Vegetable Oils, PALM OIL 
DEVELOPMENTS, Dec. 2009, at 21, Table 1, http://palmoilis.mpob.gov.my/publications/pod51-erich.pdf. 
